War Crimes Law for the Twenty-First Century by Meron, Theodor
XJII[ 
War Crimes Law for 
the Twenty .. First Century 
Theodor Meron 
A LTHOUGH THE DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE IN ROME for the establishment of an international criminal court faces many problems, 
advocates and scholars of international humanitarian law have good cause for 
some heady feelings in looking back at the groundbreaking achievements of the 
last few years.1 
With more than twenty individuals in custody, the International Tribunal 
for Former Yugoslavia is no longer in danger of running out of defendants. 
Under international pressure, Croatia arranged for the surrender of about ten 
indicted Croatian nationals and Bosnian Croats to the Hague Tribunal. In 
addition, under the Stabilization Force (SFOR) and NATO umbrella, several 
indicted persons have been captured manu militari and brought to the Hague, 
and several others have surrendered to the Tribunal. Alas, most of the indicted 
Bosnian Serbs have yet to be arrested. The principal leaders responsible for the 
atrocities are thus still free, but they are forced to hide from international 
justice, and the possibility of their arrest remains alive. 
The Hague tribunal has issued several important decisions that clarify and 
give judicial imprimatur to some rules of international humanitarian law. The 
International Tribunal for the prosecution of genocide and other violations of 
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international humanitarian law in Rwanda is functioning despite the problems 
that have plagued it during its first few years. Many of the principal indictees 
involved in the Rwandan genocide have been arrested and are in the 
Tribunal's custody. Like the Hague Tribunal, the Arusha Tribunal has 
rendered an important decision concerning its jurisdiction and the 
competence of the Security Council under Chapter VII of the United Nations 
Charter to establish the tribunaP Furthermore, the Tribunal is trying several 
cases and should issue some judgments this year. 
The work of both tribunals demonstrates that international investigations 
and prosecutions of persons responsible for serious violations of international 
humanitarian law are possible and credible. No less, the rules of procedure and 
evidence each has adopted now form the vital core of an international code of 
criminal procedure and evidence. Creating a positive environment for the 
creation of a standing international criminal court, which is likely to become a 
reality before the end of the twentieth century, these achievements have also 
given new vigor to universal jurisdiction and sparked the readiness of States to 
prosecute persons accused of serious violations of international humanitarian 
law. 
Groundbreaking as these institutional developments are, the rapid growth 
of the normative principles of international humanitarian law equals them in 
significance. International humanitarian law has developed faster since the 
beginning of the atrocities in the former Yugoslavia than in the half~century 
since the Nuremberg tribunals and the adoption of the Geneva Conventions 
for the Protection of Victims of War of 12 August 1949. Appearing in 1964, 
Wolfgang Friedmann's important book The Changing Structures oJlntemational 
Law noted that international criminal law recognized as crimes only piracy jure 
gentium and war crimes.3 Despite the potential for a more expansive vision even 
in 1964,4 the criminal aspects of international humanitarian law remained 
limited and the prospects for their international enforcement poor as late as the 
eve of the atrocities committed in Yugoslavia. 
There is of course a synergistic relationship between the statutes of the 
international criminal tribunals, the jurisprudence of the Hague Tribunal, the 
growth of customary law, its acceptance by States, and their readiness to 
prosecute offenders under the principle of universality of jurisdiction. The 
1995 T adit appeals decision of the Hague Tribunal no doubt helped in creating 
the environment that allowed the United States delegation to the Preparatory 
Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court to issue, 




The Statute for Yugoslavia confirms that crimes against humanity do not 
require a nexus with international wars, while the Statute for Rwanda extends 
this conclusion to peacetime situations and criminalizes serious violations of 
common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol II. 
Following a position already made known in 1996, the United States 
Delegation to the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an 
International Criminal Court issued a statement on 23 March 1998, urging 
support for the no,nexus approach. In part, this statement declared that: 
Contemporary international law makes it clear that no war nexus for crimes 
against humanity is required. The United States believes that crimes against 
humanity must be deterred in times of peace as well as in times of war and that 
the ICC Statute should reflect that principle. 
The United States also announced robust pOSitions-confirming its existing 
policy-concerning the criminalization of violations of common Article 3 for 
non,international armed conflicts, as well as some principles concerning the 
conduct of hostilities. The U.S. statement of March 23 thus pronounced that: 
The United States strongly believes that serious violations of the elementary 
customary norms reflected in common Article 3 should be the centerpiece of the 
ICC's subject matter jurisdiction with regard to non, international armed 
conflicts. Finally, the United States urges that there should be a section ... 
covering other rules regarding the conduct of hostilities in non,international 
armed conflicts. It is good international law, and good policy, to make serious 
violations of at least some fundamental rules pertaining to the conduct of 
hostilities in non-international armed conflicts a part of the ICC jurisdiction. 
Statutes of both ad Me tribunals criminalize rape as a crime against humanity. In 
its decisions, the Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia has already made a 
significant contribution to the elucidation of some general principles of criminal 
law, particularly duress and superior orders,S and will no doubt further clarify the 
concept of command responsibility. Among these decisions, I would criticize the 
decisions on duress in the Erdemovic case. If, in fact, Erdemovic was faced with a 
situation of the absence of any moral choice (i.e., he would have been killed had 
he refused to participate in the mass executions, in circumstances in which they 
would have proceeded in any event, as the decision of 5 March 1998 confirmed), 
I find Judge Cassese's dissent arguing for acquittal, not just mitigation of penalty, 
quite compelling. Indeed, a number of judgments under Control Council No. 10 
recognized, in principle, the plea of duress. These judgments in effect tempered 
the rigidity of the black letter law of the Nuremberg Charter. 
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Cassese's utilitarian argument in Erdemovic was that because the massacre 
would have proceeded in any event, the defendant's refusal would have 
benefitted no one and would have simply added one more victim. In such 
circumstances, Cassese argued, the law could not require Erdemovic to forfeit 
his life. Judges McDonald and Vohrah's absolutist argument rejected any 
balancing of harms and rested on a categorical prohibition. Of course, 
McDonald and Vohrah also emphasized the policy arguments for deterring 
future offenders. But under thier absolutist doctrine, a Jew forced to assist in 
operating the crematoria in T reblinka would have been denied the defense of 
duress. Would that be just? Of course, a person's refusal could inspire others to 
resist orders to kill, but in ErdemoviC's case such prospects appear utopian. 
In the area of substantive humanitarian law, the Hague Tribunal has 
advanced the concept of the applicability of the Hague law to 
non~international armed conflicts and has made a significant contribution to 
an expansive reading of customary law. 6 Even though the jurisprudence of the 
Tribunal on grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions has been rather 
disappOinting, as I show below, pending appeals still offer some hope for a 
change.7 
Not the entire jurisprudence of the Hague Tribunal is beyond criticism. I 
regret, particularly, the use of Nicaragua's imputability standard to classify the 
character of the conflict in the former Yugoslavia. Relying in this manner on 
Nicaragua was inappropriate because that case dealt with a wholly different 
question-whether or not the contras, for legal purposes, either constituted an 
organ of the United States Government or were acting on its behalf, in which 
case their acts could be attributed to the United States for purposes of State 
responsibility. As I show in greater detail elsewhere, the nexus between 
attribution and the character of the conflict found in T adic was never present 
in the International Court of}ustice Nicaragua discussion.8 
Another difficulty arises from the Tribunal's interpretation of the grave 
breaches provisions. The Appeals Chamber's expansive interpretation that 
"laws or customs of war" in Article 3 of the Tribunal's Statute reach 
noninternational armed conflicts9 largely avoided the worst possible 
consequences. However, the chamber refused to use Article 3 of its Statute 
(laws and customs of war) as a conduit to bring in conduct comprising grave 
breaches of the Geneva Conventions as customary law (grave breaches are the 
subject of Article 2 of the Statute; these can be regarded as customary law 
whose content parallels the pertinent provisions of these Conventions). 
The grave breaches are the principal crimes under the Conventions. 
Deprived of the core of international criminal law in cases deemed 
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non,international, the Tribunal could only raise the level of actionable 
violence to crimes against humanity, and perhaps in the future, genocide. Not 
only does this handicap the Tribunal's ability to carry out its mandate, but some 
commentators also criticize the resort to such heavy artillery against relatively 
minor offenders, however evil. 
For those who do not agree that the conflict is an international armed 
conflict, another option, proposed by Judge Georges Abi,Saab in his Separate 
Opinion, would be for the Tribunal to include grave breaches within the 
customary law it recognizes as applicable even to non,international armed 
conflicts.1o In its amicus brief, the U.S. Government stated that persons 
covered by common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions could be treated as 
persons protected by these Conventions.ll The Tribunal's enlightened vision 
of the customary law pertinent to both international and noninternational 
armed conflicts certainly could have encompassed grave breaches of the 
Geneva Conventions. In addition, the authoritative Field Manual (FM) 27,10 
of the U.S. Army has recognized these provisions as declaratory of customary 
law.12 
The grave breaches provisions describe certain acts as criminal and subject 
the offenders to mandatory prosecution or extradition when committed against 
protected persons, defined in the Fourth Geneva Convention as those who find 
themselves in the hands of a party to the conflict of which they are not 
nationals. Enforcing this provision literally in the Yugoslav context, and in 
some other conflicts involving the disintegration of a State or political entity 
and the resulting struggle between peoples and ethnic groups, especially when 
leading to the establishment of new States, would be the height of legalism. 
Imagine, for example, that Israelis and Arabs in the area west of the Jordan 
River still had Palestinian (Mandate) nationality during the 1947-48 war. 
Denying those captured by an adversary in that conflict the status of protected 
persons under the Geneva Conventions, had they been in force, because of 
their shared nationality would be absurd. In many contemporary conflicts, the 
disintegration of States and the establishment of new ones make nationality 
too messy a concept on which to base the application of international 
humanitarian law. 
In light of the protective goals of the Geneva Conventions, I support an 
interpretation suggesting that in situations like the one in former Yugoslavia, 
where the fighting was pervasive and its history as a single State resulted in one 
nationality, the requirement of a different nationality should simply be 
construed as referring to persons in the hands of an adversary. Indeed, the 
International Committee of the Red Cross's Commentary to Article 4 of the 
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Fourth Convention states that the reason for excluding a country's own 
nationals from the definition of protected persons was to avoid interfering in a 
State's relations with its nationals,13 a concern obviously not relevant to the 
circumstances of the Tadic case, in which each ethnic group considered 
members of other ethnic groups as foreigners. In interpreting the law, our goal 
should be to avoid paralyzing the legal process as much as possible and, in the 
case of humanitarian conventions, to enable them to serve their protective 
goals. 
Clarifying crimes against humanity is one of the Hague Tribunal's most 
important contributions. In the T adic appeal, it confirmed that: 
lilt is by now a settled rule of customary international law that crimes against 
humanity do not require a connection to international armed conflict. Indeed, as 
the Prosecutor points out, customary international law may not require a 
connection between crimes against humanity and any conflict at all. Thus, by 
requiring that crimes against humanity be committed in either internal or 
international armed conflict, the Security Council may have defined the crime in 
Article 5 more narrowly than necessary under customary international law. 
There is no question, however, that the definition of crimes against humanity 
adopted by the Security Council in Article 5 [of the Statute 1 comports with the 
principle of nul/urn crimen sine lege.14 
Interpreting the Statute's requirement that crimes against humanity be 
"directed against any civilian population," the Tribunal held that the crimes 
must involve a course of conduct and not one particular act alone.'s However, 
it subsequently explained that "as long as there is a link with the widespread or 
systematic attack against a civilian population, a single act could qualify as a 
crime against humanity,,16 and that a person who commits a crime against a 
single victim or a small number of victims could be guilty of a crime against 
humanityP 
The T adic judgment then reaffirmed that a "single act by a perpetrator taken 
within the context of a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian 
population entails individual criminal responsibility and an individual 
perpetrator need not commit numerous offences to be held liable."'s Although 
crimes against humanity can only be committed against a civilian population, 
the Tribunal construed the term "civilian population" broadly: "[T]he 
presence of those actively involved in the conflict should not prevent the 
characterization of a population as civilian and those actively involved in a 
resistance movement can qualify as victims of crimes against humanity.,,'9 For 
example, civilians or resistance fighters who had laid down their arms were 
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considered victims of crimes against humanity in the Vukovar Hospital 
Decision.2o 
Finally, interpreting the United Nations Secretary,General's report on 
Article 5 of the Statute disjunctively, the Tribunal held that the requirement 
that acts be directed against a civilian population can be fulfilled if the acts are 
either widespread or systematic.21 The United States proposal on the elements 
of crimes submitted to the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an 
International Criminal Court on 2 April 1998, takes the same approach.22 
Significantly, the Tribunal held that a policy to commit crimes against 
humanity need not be a formal one, and that it can be inferred from the manner 
of the crime. Thus, evidence that "the acts occur on a widespread or systematic 
basis that demonstrates a policy to commit those acts, whether formalized or 
not,,,23 is sufficient. Even more importantly, the Tribunal held that this policy 
to commit crimes against humanity need not be a State policy. Although 
crimes against humanity, as crimes of a collective nature, could be committed 
only by States during World War il, the Tribunal considered that customary 
international law has evolved "to take into account forces which, although not 
those of the legitimate government, have de facto control over, or are able to 
move freely within, defined territory,,,24 including terrorist groups or 
organizations. 
However, I find less persuasive the Tribunal's holding that all crimes against 
humanity, not only persecution, require discriminatory intent.15 The Tribunal 
recognized that it was departing from customary law, which did not impose 
such a discriminatory intent requirement. There was no reason for the 
Tribunal to regard the more restrictive report of the UN Secretary,GeneraF6 as 
gospel. This decision unnecessarily limits the scope of crimes against humanity, 
and a decision to follow the Nuremberg jurisprudence would have been better. 
It is important to note that in the U.S. proposal on the elements of offenses for 
the International Criminal Court presented to the Preparatory Committee, the 
requirement of discrimination is limited to those crimes against humanity that 
involve persecutionP It would have been better, I believe, to regard inhumane 
acts against a civilian population, such as murder, extermination, enslavement, 
or deportation, as crimes against humanity and to require discrimination only 
for persecutions on political, racial, and religious grounds, as in Nuremberg. I 
hasten to add that although I criticize some decisions of the Hague Tribunal on 
this point and a few others, I believe that the Tribunal and its Judges, 
Prosecutors, and Registrars have been very successful overall. The solid 
foundation they have built will now allow the international community to 
proceed towards the establishment of a standing international criminal court. 
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The Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of the International 
Criminal CourtZ8 has also made significant contributions that confirm and 
further accelerate the radical changes taking place in international 
humanitarian law. It has given unprecedented attention to the clarification 
and drafting of general principles of criminal law, including non,retroactivity, 
age of responsibility, statute oflimitations, actus reus, mens rea, mistake of fact 
or law, and various grounds for excluding criminal responsibility. 
Although considerable uncertainty about the final language defining the crimes 
within the jurisdiction of the Court still remains, the evolving texts suggest that 
apart from the crime of aggression, the inclusion of which in the statute is still 
unclear, the Court will have inherent jurisdiction over genocide, crimes against 
humanity, and war crimes, including grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions. 
The definition of the crime of genocide tracks the definitions contained in the 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. The 
section on war crimes will probably include a significant catalogue of Hague 
law-type provisions, and rape will probably be criminalized as a serious violation of 
International Humanitarian Law or grave breach, rather than only as a crime 
against humanity, which has a higher burden of proof.29 
For non,international armed conflicts, the statute of the International 
Criminal Court is likely not only to confirm the criminalization of norms stated 
in common Article 3 but also to penalize some significant violations of Hague 
law-type provisions and rape.30 However, there is still some opposition from a 
small number of States to the applicability of such crimes to non,international 
armed conflicts. Finally, crimes against humanity will probably encompass the 
the pertinent crimes in the Nuremberg Charter and possibly some forms of 
arbitrary detention. One of the proposals would include in crimes against 
humanity the causing of disappearances. 
The scope of crimes under international humanitarian law now emerging 
from the work of the Preparatory Committee has three striking aspects. First, 
most governments appear ready to accept an expansive conception of 
customary international law without much supporting practice. Second, there 
is an increasing readiness to recognize that some rules of international 
humanitarian law once considered to involve only the responsibility of States 
may also be a basis for individual criminal responsibility. There are lessons to be 
learned here about the impact of public opinion on the formation of opinio juris 
and customary law. These developments will be further reinforced by the 
ICRC's study of customary rules of international humanitarian law, now in 
progress. It remains to be seen, however, whether the greater openness to 
customary law apparent during the various meetings of the Preparatory 
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Committee will also be present when the treaty establishing the future 
international criminal court is open for signature and ratification. Third, 
because of the probable inclusion in the Statute of Common Article 3 and 
crimes against humanity, the latter divorced from a war method, we are 
witnessing a certain blurring of international humanitarian law with human 
rights law, and thus a progressive criminalization of serious violations of human 
rights. 
Another important development is the growing recognition that the 
elevation of many rules of international humanitarian law from the normative 
to the criminalized dimension creates a real need for the crimes within the 
jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court to be defined with the clarity, 
precision, and specificity required for criminal law in accordance with the 
principle oflegality (nullum crimen sine lege). The U.S. proposal on the elements 
of offenses is a step in that direction. 
These developments could not have taken place without the creation of a 
powerful new coalition of civil society driving further criminalization of 
international humanitarian law. Much like the earlier coalition that stimulated 
the development of both a corpus of international human rights law and the 
mechanisms involved in its enforcement, this new coalition includes scholars 
who promote and develop legal concepts and give them theoretical credibility, 
NOO's that provide public and political support and means of pressure, and a 
number of enlightened governments that spearhead law~making efforts in the 
United Nations. 
These institutional and normative developments will, no doubt, generate 
further growth of universal jurisdiction. Although the offenses subject to the 
jurisdiction of international criminal tribunals should not be conflated with 
international offenses subject to national jurisdiction under the universality of 
jurisdiction principle, there is a clear synergy between the two, which I have 
already mentioned. The broader list of crimes now emerging from the 
Preparatory Committee will inevitably impact national laws governing crimes 
subject to universal jurisdiction. For this reason, the broader significance of the 
International Criminal Court's Statute exceeds its immediate goals. 
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